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FEDERAL TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE WEALTH
R. DALE SWIHARTt
Life insurance constitutes one of the most favored, as well as one of
the most complex, forms of holding wealth. The favored treatment is
given, inter alia, in the federal Bankruptcy Act,' state inheritance acts,2
state exemption statutes,3 and the federal taxing statutes.' Tax and in-
surance literature published since the passage of the 1954 Internal Reve-
nue Code is replete with labors of love pleading that insurance is the
panacea for the problems of the estate planner.5 Recent Congressional
t Assistant Professor of Law, The University of New Mexico.
1. 11 U.S.C. § 110a(5) (1958) provides the following proviso: "That when any
bankrupt, who is a natural person, shall have any insurance policy which has a cash
surrender value payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives, he may, with-
in thirty days after the cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated to the trus-
tee by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so ascertained
and stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry such policy free from the claims of the
creditors participating in the distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy proceed-
ings, otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets." This proviso is analyzed
and the courts' use of it is discussed in Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in
Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. Rav. 678, 732-38 (1960).
2. For example, IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-2401 (Burns 1953) provides: "Proceeds of
life insurance policies on the life of a decedent payable in such a manner as to be subject
to claims against his estate and to distribution as a part thereof shall be hereunder held
to be a part of the estate, but payable either directly or in trust for the use of any person
or persons other than the estate so that it does not become a part thereof or subject to
such claims, said proceeds shall not be taxed."
3. See Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors' Remedies in the United States, 4
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 583 (1957) and Joslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws: Time for Moderni-
cation, 34 IND. L. J. 355, 368-72 (1959).
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101.
5. See, among a myriad of others, Hoxie, Four Uses of Life Insurance: Tax Fa-
vored Features for Estate Planning, 99 TRUSTS & ESTATES 722 (1960) ; Hammer, The
Role of Life Insurance, 9 U. FLA. L. REV. 442 (1956); Katz, Life Insurance: Tax Treal2
ment and Planning, 35 MIcH. S.B.J. 85 (March 1956); and Lawthers, Federal Tax C61-
sequences of Life Insurance in Buy and Sell Agreements, 8 TULANE TAX INST. 7t
(1959). But voices have been raised in dissent to the proposition that life insurance is
the ultimate weapon in the estate planner's arsenal. For what is perhaps the best j6b of
sticking the pin in the balloon, see Wilkinson, Life Insurance and Estate Plannibt'Tax
Aspects, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 167, 191-97 (1959). Professor Wilkinson concludes- "iaer a
thoughtful analysis, that most of the tax benefits claimed for life insurance falltpt one
of three categories. They may be illusory; the use of life insurance may be thd.iioper
vehicle for securing the tax advantage; and finally "when the purported benef411tially
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hearings' dealing with the problems of the taxing base and taxes as a
stimulant or depressant to economic development have produced recom-
mendations by panelists to decrease the favoritism granted to life in-
surance wealth." In haphazard fashion, federal courts have rendered
tax decisions both favorable and unfavorable to life insurance wealth.
The thread of uniformity in these cases has been the disregard of the
reality of the insurance investment, and the reliance on the form of the
insurance contract as the "criterion for decision.
The complexity of the insurance form of holding wealth arises
from the multitude of policy provisions' and combinations of invest-
ment and pure insurance which are available in individual life insurance
contracts.9 A policy may represent little economic wealth to the owner
and his family one day and a considerable addition to family wealth the
next.1" The investment represented by the insurance policy is often
confused with the policy itself." This complexity very likely accounts
for certain of the favored provisions appearing in the Internal Revenue
Code and for the courts' difficulties in applying the Code provisions.
exist, they may merely represent one side of the enhanced gamble inherent in life in-
surance." Id. at 197.
6. See Hearings Before Subcommittee on Tax Policy of the Joint Committee on
the Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND STABILITY (Joint Comm. Print 1955) and STAFF OF HOUSE Comm. ox
WAYS AND MEANS, 85TH CONG., 2D SEss., TAX RFvIsION COMPENDIUM (Comm. Print
1959).
7. Among others Paul, Erosion of the Tax Base and Rate Structure, FEDERAL TAX
POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY, supra note 6, at 301 and Surrey, The
Federal Income Tax Base for Individuals, TAX REVIsIoN COMPENDIUM, mpra note 6,
at 6.
8. For a detailed discussion of the various provisions which may be included in a
life insurance policy, see KRUEGER AND WAGGONER, THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY CON-
TRACT (1953).
9. These combinations also vary over the life of an individual policy. See Table 9
in VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 410-11 (1947) which shows the break-
down of premiums into expenses, savings, and amount needed for current protection, as
well as interest earned and cash surrender values for a sample policy over a 75 year span.
10. On the other hand, of course, the policyholder may suffer real economic loss
if the premiums he pays and the interest that amount would have earned in another form
of investment exceed the face value of the policy. See Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 191-92.
11. In only one area of the taxation of life insurance have the courts been willing
to look beyond the contract to the investment. In the leading case on the valuation of
life insurance for gift tax purposes, Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 257 (1941)
the Supreme Court observed:
Surrender of a policy represents only one of the rights of the insured or bene-
ficiary . . . . But the owner of a fully paid life insurance policy has more
than the mere right to surrender it; he has the right to retain it for its invest-
ment virtues and to receive the face amount of the policy upon the insured's
death. . . . All of the economic benefits of a policy must be taken into con-
sideration . . . . To single out one and to disregard the other is in effect to
substitute a different property interest for the one which was the subject of
the gift.
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Wealth held in the form of life insurance may be analyzed from
the point of view of each of the three elements of the life insurance
transaction-the premiums paid, the investment and the proceeds.12
Amounts paid as premiums are divided among the principal of the
investment which accrues interest until the time the policy matures, the
amounts for current insurance protection and the amounts to cover cost
and profit' for the company. The investment itself, before maturity,
represents the capital invested, the interest accretions and the right to
pass on at death the face value or the right during life to surrender for
cash value." The proceeds at maturity represent the amount of the
investment, the interest earned on the investment and pure insurance
gain or loss." It is submitted that difficulties in analysis arise when
Congress and the courts overlook these three components of the in-
surance transaction and look to the forms of individual insurance
contracts.
I. PRESENT STATUTORY STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL LIFE INSURANCE
TAXATION WITH PROPOSED CHANGES
A. Policy Considerations.
Two basic notions-equality and ability to pay' 6 -form the theo-
retical touchstones for the structure of the Internal Revenue Code. Al-
though the concepts are interrelated,"7 they may be distinguished as
12. See Vrctory, op. cit. supra note 9, at 407-16.
13. A majority of life insurance investments are made in mutual companies. Mu-
tual companies make surplus distributions only to their policyholders, and in this sense
the companies operate on a non-profit basis. See KRUEGER AND WAGGONER, Op. cit. mspra
note 8, at 250.
14. The text discussion assumes a whole life policy. If the insurance is term in-
surance the investment features discussed are usually lacking; however, most term
policies contain a clause granting a right to convert into permanent insurance, and there-
fore are not completely non-investment policies. For a discussion of various types of
insurance policies see PATTERSON AND YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
INSURANcE 718-22 (4th ed. 1961).
15. Gain accrues when the amounts held by the company as principal and the in-
terest on those amounts do not total as much as the face value paid. Loss is suffered
when those amounts exceed the face value of the policy.
16. For a study of the history of our progressive tax system see PAUL, TAXATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 714-64 (1954).
17. Actually "interrelated" may be somewhat misleading. The concept of equality
is the primary theoretical basis, while ability to pay is a secondary construct. The con-
cept of equality could be complied with if all persons regardless of amount of income
had included in gross income all economic income and then were taxed at a level rate.
The construct of ability to pay divides "all persons" into groups with the equality of
treatment then applied to all those falling within the particular group. Alf Ross has
discussed this problem as follows:
It does not amount to much to maintain that wages shall be apportioned equally,
taxes assessed equally. These are empty formulae unless it is further deter-
mined by what criteria 'equally' shall be determined. . T.. 4hle ideal of equality
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follows. The concept of tax equality is implemented by imposing ap-
proximately the same tax on persons who are similarly situated in rela-
tion to economic goods."8 Ability to pay is recognized by the ascending
tax rate on levels of taxable incomes, gifts and estates. 9 Subsumed
by these notions are a range of value judgments which are beyond the
range of the discussion in this article.2"
A uniform taxing base lends substance to the theory.2 Whenever
the tax base is narrowed by exceptions and exclusions the tax structure
does not adhere to the fundamental notions upon which it rests. For
example, when income is excluded from one person's taxable income
because it is derived from interest on an insurance investment22 or
interest on municipal bonds2" and income is included in another person's
gross income because it is from a non-preferred source, the same tax
rate is not applied to individuals situated similarly in relation to economic
as such therefore simply means the correct application of a general rule (ir-
respective of which one). The general concepts or characteristics employed in
the rule define a certain class of persons (or situations) with regard to whom a
certain treatment shall take place. The equal treatment of all those within this
class is then simply the necessary consequence of the correct application of the
rule.
ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 272-73 (1959).
18. The fact that the equality is implemented by imposing the tax equally upon
groups (persons similarly situated in relation to economic goods) does not seem to be a
necessary criterion for equality. The formation of the groups on the basis of the simi-
larity of economic gains of those within the particular class or group depends on the
second construct-ability to pay.
19. The value judgment underlying ability to pay rests upon the hypothesis that as
income increases it is easier for the taxpayer to spend a greater proportion of his dollar
for taxes. Thus, the progressive tax is not proportional; as income increases the rate is
increased at higher and higher levels. A man may pay more than twice as much tax
when he earns twice as much income. "In this context ability to pay is the inverse of
sacrifice, and a declining value for money up the scale of acquisition is part of the
ability to pay doctrine." PAUL, op. cit. supra note 16 at 737-38.
20. Compare the statements of Ross, supra note 17 with Edmond Cahn's analysis:
"Through progressive taxation of economic relations, governments apply that propor-
tionateness which Aristotle found the true substance of justice. The equality here is that
of an ascending rate series." [emphasis added]. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTIcE 40
(1949). I have great difficulty justifying the ability to pay doctrine on the grounds of
equality, unless the equality sought is the equal distribution of wealth throughout the
society. The ability to pay doctrine rests upon the value judgment that there should be
a redistribution of wealth, and the comment that the ascending rate series results in an
equality in taxation is nonsense. The two touchstones rest on different value judgments:
the group lines are formed by the ability to pay doctrine in order to redistribute the
wealth; withiil the groups thus formed the principle of equality is applied to the indi-
viduals within each of the groups.
21. Note that it is essential to have a uniform taxing base to have equality of taxa-
tion within the groups, and further, it is necessary for redistribution of wealth between
groups.
22. See infra note 31, and accompanying text.
23. INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, § 103.
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goods. There is inequality in the application of the tax, and the ascend-
ing rate does not function according to ability to pay.
As a practical matter, the tax structure is manipulated by the fed-
eral government to accomplish special goals other than the production
of revenue.24 All too often these goals are sought by means which
emasculate the basic theories underlying the taxing structure.2" Never-
theless, it is unrealistic to think that Congress will abandon all exclusions
and deductions in favor of tax credits and an averaging system.26 In
the absence of a sweeping reform of the Internal Revenue Code to bring
it in line uniformly with the theories upon which it rests, a searching
analysis of each individual grant of special dispensation seems in order.
B. Income Taxation.
Presently, interest earned on the insurance investment escapes in-
come taxation. The amount of current increment on the investment
which escapes is considerable-estimated for a recent year to be 1.1
billion dollars.2 Furthermore, when the policy proceeds are paid, no
inclusion of the accrued interest is made in the gross income of the
owner or beneficiary.2" Section 101 of the 1954 Code also offers an
escape from taxation of the first $1000 each year of the interest on
insurance proceeds left in the hands of the insurer to be paid in install-
ments to the beneficiary-spouse."
There is no special reason why interest earned on the life insurance
investment escapes taxation. No overriding economic goal distinguishes
interest earned on the life insurance investment from other kinds of
interest which are expressly included in gross income by Section 61 of
24. See FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONoIc GROWTH AND STABILITY, supra note 6.
25. If Congress decides that a subsidy to the oil and gas industries is necessary, a
direct subsidy with specific goals in mind and the limitations on the subsidy to force an
accomplishment of those goals would be far better than an inefficient indirect subsidy
through the depletion allowance. In the case of humanitarian deductions and exemp-
tions "the income tax suffers from the fatal flaw . . . it doles out an upside-down
subsidy that grows in value with the size of income." Heller, Some Observations on the
Role and Reform of the Federal Income Tax, TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM, supra note 6,
at 181, 191. Thus, a specific tax credit for the aged, the blind, persons with dependents,
etc., would accomplish the aid without the sacrifice of a uniform tax base and without
the inequity inherent in the deduction-exemption system. Note that the dollar value of
a $600 exclusion ranges from $120 to $546 depending upon the rate group within which
the taxpayer falls, while the need for the subsidy is in inverse proportion.
26. The real need for an averaging system is to prevent income earned over a
period of years from being included in a particular taxable year's gross income. An
averaging system would eliminate the policy argument behind a capital gains rate for
income from sale of assets. See VicIMEY, op. cit. supra, note 9, at 417-27.
27. Pechman, Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, 10 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 17 (1957).
28. INT. REv. CODE Op 1954, § 101(a) (1).
29. INT. REv. CODE Op 1954, § 101(d) (1).
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the 1954 Code.3 As a matter of fact, no special provision of the Code
provides for the exclusion from gross income of the interest earned on
the life insurance investment. The special treatment granted seems to
have arisen in haphazard fashion, rather than as a result of an express
judgment of Congress."' As a matter of sound taxing policy the interest
earned on an investment in life insurance should be taxed in the same
manner as interest earned on other types of investments.
There are several deterrents to taxing the interest as it accrues.
Separating the investment principal and the interest from the costs of
pure insurance and overhead for each individual policyholder is dif-
ficult. 2 If the task were imposed on the company to make the separa-
tion for each individual policyholder it would be time consuming and
expensive. If the individual were forced to compute for himself, many
erroneous computations and failures to include at all would result. Fin-
ally, the difficulty in passing the necessary statutory provision over the
objections of a powerful lobby may be not only difficult, but doomed
from the outset.3 Undoubtedly the best way to handle these problems34
is to institute a withholding scheme, and place the burden on the insurance
company to make the necessary computation." The interest computation
for ease of administration might be the interest figure assumed by the
company in the determination of premiums.6 In the absence of a with-
holding procedure the individual policy holder would be required to obtain
the interest figure from the company. Under any scheme, the adminis-
trative chore for the company would be far from slight; however, the
withholding plan presently in operation causes expense to employers,
and there is no reason that insurance companies cannot absorb the cost
in overhead as is true of employers presently withholding from wages.
If the owner of the policy has been taxed on the interest as it
accrued, obviously no inclusion of that interest should be made when
the policy matures. The exclusion of $1,000 of interest per year by the
30. INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 61(a) (4).
31. See Surrey, op. cit. supra note 7, at 6.
32. Nevertheless, the job is not overly difficult or burdensome. The companies
already have set up certain procedures for determining the policyholders' contribution
to the surplus on hand for distribution through dividends. See KRUEGER AND WAGGONER,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 250-63.
33. See generally, Cary, Pressure Groups and the Increasing Erosion of the Reve-
nue Laws, FEDE.AL TAX POLICY FOR ECONoMIc GROWTH AND STABILITY 260 (joint
Comm. Print 1955).
34. Except the last problem, for which there is no real answer except, perhaps, an
informed Congress.
35. Surrey has suggested the withholding of life insurance interest as a part of a
general program of interest withholding. Surrey, op. cit. supra note 7, at 6.
36. The actual rate of interest earned by a mutual company during the preceding
year could be used. In the case of stock companies the statutory rate would be used.
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beneficiary-spouse, however, is an exclusion of interest earned after
the death of the insured." The exclusion is undoubtedly intended to aid
the widow when financial troubles may be heaped on her distress at the
husband's death. But there are better means to aid surviving spouses,
and those who are not beneficiaries of insurance policies are probably in
more financial trouble. The fairer procedure to follow in granting a
subsidy to widows is a tax credit of a specific sum for a certain period
of years after the husband's death.
One of the most critical problems is whether at the death of the
insured the excess of the face value over the principal and interest should
be included in gross income. Under the present provisions of the Code,
regardless of who owns the policy, this amount escapes income taxation.3
In order to determine whether this amount should be included it is
essential that the insurance transaction be analyzed as an investment. 9
The use of insurance as an investment by the owner should not be
treated differently than investments in other forms. An investment in
land which is held at death by the investor receives a stepped-up basis
in the hands of the devisee,4" but if a gift of the land is made by the
owner-decedent before his death no stepped-up basis is received4' unless
the gift was made in contemplation of death.42 The same type of treat-
ment should be accorded life insurance.
37. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (d) (1) provides "The amounts held by an in-
surer with respect to any beneficiary shall be prorated . . . over the period or periods
with respect to which such payments are to be made. There shall be excluded from the
gross income of such beneficiary in the taxable year received-(A) any amount de-
termined by such proration, and (B) in the case of the surviving spouse of the insured,
that portion of the excess of the amounts received under one or more agreements speci-
fied in paragraph (2) (A) [which defines an amount held by an insurer] . . . over the
amount determined in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph which is not greater than
$1000 with respect to any insured."
38. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a) (1) provides: "Except as otherwise provided
in paragraph (2) [where transfer of insurance policy was for valuable consideration]
and in subsection (d) [when amount is held by insurer for period after death of insured],
gross income does not include amounts received (whether in a single sum or otherwise)
under a life insurance contract, if such amounts are paid by reason of the death of the
insured."
39. Professor William Vickrey has suggested that life insurance should be treated
much as crop or accident and health insurance, so the premiums paid would be deductible
expense, except for the amount accumulated as savings; the policy holder would have
the interest on the savings included in his gross income as it accrues; and the beneficiary
would include in his gross income the difference between the face value and the invest-
ment component of the insurance. Vickrey suggests an avraging device for the inclu-
sion in the beneficiary's gross income so inclusion of a pro rata amount would be made
during the remaining actuarial life expectancy of the insured-decedent. VicEREY, AGENDA
FOR PROGRESsIVE TAXATION 64-67 (1947).
40. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1014.
41. INT. R1Zv. CODE OF 1954, § 1015.
42. INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 1014(b) (9).
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There are three types of fact patterns which may occur at the death
of the insured. These may be discussed more easily by using the follow-
ing cast of characters: B is the beneficiary; C is the insured (the
cestui que vie) and 0 is an owner who is neither the insured nor the
beneficiary. Under present Code provisions, in the absence of a transfer-
for-value,43 no income tax consequences ensue regardless of who owns
the policy at the date of C's death.4 Thus, unlike other investments, a
stepped-up basis is allowed the insurance investment whether or not
the value of the property is included in C's gross estate. There is no
cogent reason for this favored treatment of the insurance method of
holding wealth. In the two cases where B or 0 own the insurance policy
at the date of C's death, income tax consequences should apply. As in
the case of other kinds of investments, these consequences under our
present tax structure should be capital gain.45  If B is the owner of the
policy at the death of C the Internal Revenue Code should force B to
recognize capital gain in the amount of the difference between the face
value of the proceeds and his basis in the policy. If 0 is the owner of
the policy the same income tax consequences should apply. If C is the
owner of the policy the stepped-up basis rule should be effective, and
thus no capital gain.4"
If the life insurance transaction is taxed as an investment and capi-
tal gain or loss is to be computed, some method of arriving at a basis in
the property needs to be determined. Clearly, the amount of the con-
tribution to the reserve for the policy and the interest on that contribu-
43. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (a) (2) provides "In the case of a transfer for a
valuable consideration, by assignment or otherwise, of a life insurance contract or any
interest therein, the amount excluded from gross income by paragraph (1) shall not
exceed an amount equal to the sum of the actual value of such consideration and the
premiums and other amounts subsequently paid by the transferee. The preceding sen-
tence shall not apply in the case of such a transfer-
(A) if such contract or interest therein has a basis for determining gain or loss in
the hands of the transferee determined in whole or in part by reference to such basis of
such contract or interest therein in the hands of the transferor, or
(B) if such transfer is to the insured, to a partner of the insured, to a partnership
in which the insured is a partner, or to a corporation in which the insured is a share-
holder or officer."
44. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (a) (1). See note 38 supra.
45. The definition of capital gain in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221 is clearly broad
enough to encompass insurance policies. A special provision would be necessary to al-
low capital gain treatment, since the maturing of the policy would not comply with the
requirement of a "sale or exchange." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1222. Since the death
of the decedent is the event which determines gain or loss on the life insurance policy,
the maturing of the policy at that time should be considered a sale or exchange of the
policy.
46. Even in the absence of § 101, this result would be reached under § 1014(b) (9)
of the 1954 Code.
47. Since this is the investment basis, the total amount paid as premiums would
not suffice.
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tion (upon which income tax has been paid) should be included in the
basis. The difficult question is whether the amount devoted to current
insurance protection and the amount siphoned off to pay for company
overhead should be included in determining basis. The amount paid for
company cost and profit should be included in determining basis, in the
same manner as broker's fees are added to the basis for an investment
in stock." The amount paid for current insurance protection, however,
bears more resemblance to a current personal expense' than it does to
an investment cost, and for this reason should not be included in basis.
In summary, the basis for the investment should be determined by add-
ing (1) the premiums paid (less the amount paid for current pure in-
surance protection) and (2) interest on the investment which has been
included in gross income by the owner.
Section 101 of the 1954 Code provides that if a life insurance policy
is transferred for valuable consideration the general rule excluding from
gross income amounts paid under a life insurance contract, by reason
of the death of the insured, does not apply." The transfer-for-value
rule appears to be an attempt by Congress to limit the tax favoritism to
intra-family transfers of life insurance" as the rule does not apply when
a gift is made, and ordinarily such a gift will occur only within the
family."2 Also excepted under the rule are transfers to a partner of
the insured, a partnership of which the insured is a partner, a corpora-
tion in which the insured is a shareholder or officer " and to transfers
in connection with tax exempt reorganizations. "4 Under the proposal
made here no transfer-for-value rule would be appropriate, since any
48. INT. Riv. CODE OF 1954, § 1016(a) (1). Some amount of these charges are
properly allocable to current pure insurance protection. Therefore, the full amount
should not be allowed in adjusting basis. Since the job of allocating is somewhat guess-
worl, and the amount is not overly significant, it seems, nevertheless, best to allow the
full amount in adjusting basis.
49. No part of this amount is added to the individual insurance contract investment,
or is needed to fund the payment which would be made should the insured survive his
actuarial life-span. The amount is needed to fund a reserve to meet the costs of paying
proceeds on contracts where the insureds have not survived their actuarial life-spans.
The individual insured joins other in a joint reserve to meet these latter payments of
proceeds. See VicKREY, op. cit. supra note 39, at 410-11, for a table illustrating the
composition of insurance premiums and proceeds.
50. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a) (2). See note 43 supra.
51. See the discussion of the rule in Bowe, Tax Problems in Ownership of Life
Insurance Contracts by Persons Other than the Insured, 49 GEO. LJ. 1, 10-13 (1960).
52. Although even when a gift is intended within the family the transfer-for-value
rule may be applicable. Bowe suggests that the rule should be applied only when there
is a transfer to a person with no insurable interest in the insured. Id. at 11.
53. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (a) (2) (B). See note 43 supra.
54. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §101 (a) (2) (A). See note 43 supra.
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owner 5 of the policy at the death of the insured, except the insured
himself,"8 would be subject to capital gain or loss treatment.
C. Gift Taxation.
When a life insurance policy is irrevocably transferred the gift tax
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code are applicable,57 and when the
owner of the policy is neither the insured nor the beneficiary, as a general
rule, there is a gift of the proceeds to the beneficiary from the owner
when the insured dies.5" Life insurance is accorded the same tax treat-
ment as other property in the application of the gift tax," but the
valuation problems which arise are somewhat more complex."0 Gen-
erally the value of a gift of life insurance is the replacement cost of the
policy.6' This value is not the cost to the transferor nor the cash sur-
55. Note it is the owner who recognizes the gain or loss, not the beneficiary (un-
less he is also the owner). The owner holds the investment and should be the one to
recognize the gain or loss even though the proceeds are payable to the beneficiary. In
this situation, the owner will also be subject to payment of a gift tax, as well as being
subject to the capital gain or loss treatment. See note 59 infra, and accompanying text.
56. At present under the transfer-for-value rule a transfer to the insured is not
covered. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (a) (2) (B). See note 43 spra.
57. NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2511. The Gift Tax Regulations state: "If the in-
sured purchases a life insurance policy, or pays a premium on a previously issued policy,
the proceeds of which are payable to a beneficiary or beneficiaries other than his estate,
and with respect to which the insured retains no reversionary interest in himself or his
estate and no power to revest the economic benefits in himself or his estate or to change
the beneficiaries or their proportionate benefits (or if the insured relinquishes by as-
signment, by designation of a new beneficiary or otherwise, every such power that was
retained in a previously issued policy), the insured has made a gift of the value of the
policy, or to the extent of the premium paid, even though the right of the assignee or
beneficiary to receive the benefits is conditioned upon his surviving the insured." Treas.
Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (8) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6542, 1961 IiT. REv. Buu.. No. 12,
at 8.
58. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2511. The Gift Tax Regulations provide that "the
gift tax also applies to gifts indirectly made. Thus, all transactions whereby property
or property rights or interests are gratuitously passed or conferred upon another, regard-
less of the means or device employed, constitute gifts subject to tax." Treas. Reg.§ 25.2511-1(c) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6542, 1961 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 12, at 8. In
Goodman v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1946), the taxpayer created a re-
vocable trust and transferred, inter alia, certain policies of insurance to the trust. The
power of revocation was reserved during the taxpayer's husband's life. When he died
the Commissioner contended the face value of the policies were a completed gift to the
beneficiaries of the trust The court held for the Commissioner on the grounds that
when the husband died the gift was complete and the policies matured. Therefore, the
death of the husband had several consequences; "it instantaneously terminated the tax-
payer's power to revoke her trust and therefore perfectd the gift, and it also matured
the policies of insurance upon his life." Goodman v. Commissioner, supra at 219.
59. NT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2511 applies generally to transfers, including life in-
surance.
60. See Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254 (1941). See the quotation from the
case in note 11 supra.
61. "The value of a life insurance contract or of a contract for the payment of an
annuity issued by a company regularly engaged in the selling of contracts of that charac-
ter is established through the sale by the company of comparable contracts. As valua-
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render value of the policy;62 rather it is the amount necessary to purchase
a similar policy on the date of the transfer." If this amount is impos-
sible to determine, the value of the gift is the interpolated terminal
reserve value of the policy. 4 The rationale underlying the imposition of
the gift tax on transfers of life insurance is proper. The transfer is
taxed as the transfer of an investment; thus, the issue in determining
value is not the amount the owner could receive by cancelling the policy
(cash surrender value) but the value of the investment (replacement
cost or interpolated terminal reserve value)."
D. Estate Taxation.
The provision for the inclusion of the value of life insurance pro-
ceeds in the gross estate has probably been subject to more alteration
and confusion than has been engendered by any other provision in the
history of the estate tax. " Prior to 1942 the Code called for the in-
clusion of amounts received as insurance by the executor and amounts
in excess of $40,000 receivable by all other beneficiaries of policies taken
out by the decedent on his own life.17  The phrase "taken out by the
decedent" was interpreted in many ways,6" including policies for which
tion of an insurance policy through sale of comparable contracts is not readily ascertain-
able when the gift is of a contract which has been in force for some time and on which
further premium payments are to be made, the value may be approximated by adding to
the interpolated terminal reserve at the date of the gift the proportionate part of the
gross premium last paid before the date of the gift which covers the period extending
beyond that date. If, however, because of the unusual nature of the contract such ap-
proximation is not reasonably close to the full value, this method may not be used."
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6 (1958), as amended, T.D. 6542, 1961 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 12, at
8.
62. Except in the case of an immediate transfer after purchase of the policy. See
Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254 (1941).
63. The rule is well settled by three companion cases decided by the Supreme
Court. See the three opinions of the Court delivered by Mr. Justice Douglas in Gug-
genheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254 (1941), Powers v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 259
(1941), and United States v. Ryerson, 312 U.S. 260 (1941).
64. See the Gift Tax Regulations quoted in note 61 supra. For a discussion of
these Regulations see LOWNDES AND KRAma!E, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES 511-12
(1956) and Bowe, supra note 51, at 2-3.
65. See the quotation from Guggenheim v. Rasquin in note 11 supra.
66. See MERTENS, LAW oF FEDERAL GiFT AND ESTATE TAxATION §§ 17.03-17.04
(1959) and Schlesinger, Taxes and Insurance: A Suggested Solution to the Uncertain
Cost of Dying, 55 HAav. L. Rav. 226 (1941).
67. From 1919 to 1942 the provision read: "To the extent of the amount receiv-
able by the executor as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own
life; and to the extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other
beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life."
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(f), 40 Stat. 1957; Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136,
§ 402(f), 42 Stat. 227; Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 302(g), 43 Stat. 253; Revenue
Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302(g), 44 Stat. 9; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 811(g), 53
Stat. 1.
68. See Paul, Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax, 52 HARv. L. REv. 1037
(1939) and Schlesinger, supra note 66.
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the decedent had signed the application;69 where the decedent owned the
policies at death;7" and where the decedent paid the premiums on the
policies." The Revenue Act of 1942 eliminated the phrase and the
$40,000 exclusion and provided that the proceeds of all policies receivable
by beneficiaries as insurance upon the life of the decedent would be
included in the gross estate if the policies had been purchased with prem-
iums paid directly or indirectly by the decedent or if the decedent had
possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership over the
policy." In several cases litigated under the 1942 provision,73 the tax-
payer contested the validity of including proceeds of policies which had
been purchased with premiums paid by the decedent, but over which
the decedent had retained no incidents of ownership. This constitu-
tional objection was laid to rest by United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l
Bank.7"
Section 2042 of the 1954 Code includes in the gross estate amounts
receivable by the executor under policies on the life of the decedent,
and amounts receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance on the
life of the decedent under policies with respect to which the decedent
possessed at his death any incident or incidents of ownership."5 The
69. Seemingly this test was rejected by the Commissioner from the beginning.
See Treas. Reg. 37 (1919) Art. 32, reprinted in Schlesinger, supra note 66, at 230.
70. See Paul, supra note 68, at 1046-47, and cases there cited.
71. See Schlesinger, supra note 66, at 230-35.
72. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 811(g), 53 Stat. 1, as amended by the Revenue
Act of 1942 provided as follows:
(g) PROCEEDS OF LIFE INSURANCE-
(1) RECEIVABLE BY THE EXEcuTo.-To the extent of the amount receivable by
the executor as insurance under policies upon the life of the decedent.
(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER BENEFIciArES.-To the extent of the amount re-
ceivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies upon the life of the de-
cedent (A) purchased with premiums, or other consideration, paid directly or indirectly
by the decedent, in proportion that the amount so paid by the decedent bears to the
total premiums paid for the insurance, or (B) with respect to which the decedent
possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or
in conjunction with any other person ... "
73. See especially Kohl v. United States, 226 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1955). Also
see cases cited by the Supreme Court in United States v. Manufacturers National
Bank, 363 U.S. 194, 197 (1960).
74. 363 U.S. 194 (1960). The following is the significant language of the Court:
"Under the statute, the occasion for the tax is the maturing of the beneficiaries' right
to the proceeds upon the death of the insured. . . . That disposition, which began
with the payment of premiums by the insured, is completed by his death. His death
creates a genuine enlargement of the beneficiaries' rights. It is the 'generating source'
of the full value of the proceeds .... The maturing of the right to proceeds is there-
fore an appropriate occasion for taxing the transaction to the estate of the insured."
363 U.S. at 198-99.
75. NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042 provides: "The value of the gross estate shall
include the value of all property-
(1) RECEIVABLE BY THE EXECUTOR.-To the extent of the amount receivable by
the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent.
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1954 Code eliminated the payment-of-premiums test, but various pro-
posals have been made for Congress to re-introduce the payment-of-
premiums test,76 and of course no unconstitutionality argument would
lie should Congress do so.7 Before another change is made in the
estate taxation of life insurance, however, a critical evaluation of the
ends sought should be made. The problem, stated in the terms of the
thesis of this article, is whether life insurance should be given estate
tax treatment similar to that given other investments." As is true of
(2) RIECEVABLE BY OTHER BENEFicrAES.-To the extent of the amount receivable
by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent with
respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership,
exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person ....
76. See, among others, Bittker, Recommendations for Revision of Federal Estate
and Gift Taxes, FEDmL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOmIC GROWTH AND STABILITY, Op. Cit.
supra note 6, at 868-69 and LOWNDES AND KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 64, at 279-81.
77. United States v. Manufacturers National Bank, 363 U.S. 194 (1960).
78. Lowndes and Kramer beg the question by stating that "Life insurance should
not be taxed like other property, because it is not like other property." LOWNDES AND
KRA R, op. cit. supra note 64, at 280. In reality, what they seem to mean is, by trans-
ferring life insurance, estate tax advantages accrue which do not follow the transfer of
other kinds of property; but their analysis falls under inspection. Three basic distinc-
tions are accorded merit by Lowndes and Kramer: (1) The gift tax is less a deterrent
to transfer of life insurance than it is to transfers of other property, since the tax is
levied only on the replacement cost rather than the face value. The simple answer to
this argument is that at the time the investment is transferred it is worth only what it
costs to replace it; the fact that the transferee may build up its value by the payment
of premiums does not retroactively increase the value at the time of transfer. The trans-
fer of a $15,000 house with a $10,000 mortgage does not make the value of the transfer
$15,000 because the transferee may make the mortgage payments. Nor does the gamble
inherent in life insurance (see note 5 supra) increase the worth at the time of transfer;
the total payments and interest earned may still exceed the face value of the policy.
Lowndes and Kramer make the further statement that the replacement cost "in the case
of a new policy will only be a minor fraction of the face amount of the policy."(!) Ibid.
The value of the policy is obviously the cost to the transferor in the case of a new policy;
its worth in the hands of the transferee is that cost-the transferee could have purchased
the policy himself for that amount (assuming he has an insurable interest, which is more
than likely). (2) The insured may be able to pay the premiums through gifts to the
insured which do not exceed the annual exclusion. This is obviously true, but the
amounts could also be used to purchase the policy (take out the policy) by the bene-
ficiary. The fact that gifts are made to use up the annual exclusion and are used to pay
premiums on insurance policies is no more argument for including the transferred in-
surance policies, than it would be for including stocks or bonds which were purchased
with the gift. The only point made is that the estate tax may be circumvented by mak-
ing annual gifts. (3) Finally, Lowndes and Kramer argue that it is easier to rid the
gross estate of insurance through transfer than other property, since there is less pos-
sibility of loss of enjoyment through transfer of insurance policies. For medium in-
come families (and lower income families) the loss of the loan value may make im-
possible the sending of children to college, the necessary cash to weather a serious ill-
ness or the meeting of the trauma of loss of income in later years. Naturally, in the
high income families, the insurance policy may be transferred without noticeable loss of
any enjoyment-but so might 1,000 shares of A.T.&T. Lowndes and Kramer make the
statement: "A person does not purchase insurance on his life in order to use and enjoy
it as he would an automobile." Ibid. This is true of any investment property; an invest-
ment is used to secure a return and to form a savings. Insurance is not unique in this
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other investments, the purchaser of life insurance assumes a risk of
loss or a possibility of gain.79 If the insured lives beyond a certain
age the amount of premiums paid and the interest which would have
accrued had the investment been made in another form of property will
be greater than the face value of the policy, and an economic loss is
suffered by the owner. On the other hand, should the insured die
before the premiums paid and the interest thereon equal the face value
of the policy, a gain is made by the owner. An investment in life in-
surance is subject to the same vagaries of gain or loss as other invest-
ments-the single difference is that the gain or loss depends upon the
time of death of the insured and not upon market price variations.
Because the death of the insured is the critical element in determ-
ining gain or loss, the argument is often made that life insurance is
really "death insurance," and should not be given the same estate tax
treatment as other investments."0 Thus, it is suggested that the insured
should include in his gross estate the value of the proceeds if he owns
the policy (and therefore holds the wealth at death) or if he provided
the economic source of the wealth (through the payment of premiums)."
There are many persuasive arguments against this analysis. There are
regard. An attempt to differentiate insurance from other investments for estate tax
purposes fails.
79. See note 5 supra.
80. See Bittker, supra note 76. In 1954 the Democratic minority of the House
Ways and Means Commmittee made the following statement:
It is sought to justify this change [eliminating the payment of premiums]
as merely putting life insurance on a par with other property which may be
given away free from estate tax if the gift is not made "in contemplation of
death." But life insurance is not like other property. It is inherently testa-
mentary in nature. It is designed, in effect, to serve as a will, regardless of its
investment features. Where the insured has paid the premiums on life insur-
ance for the purpose of adding to what he leaves behind at his death for his
beneficiaries, the insurance proceeds should be included in his taxable estate.
We predict that if this provision becomes law, it will virtually do away
with the estate taxation of life insurance. To avoid the tax, the insured need
only assign the policy to his wife or other beneficiary. Since estates of less
than $60,000 are nontaxable, only the wealthy will benefit.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. B14 (1954). A comment needs to be made
about the statement that only the wealthy will benefit. Even if the premium-payment
test were re-enacted, the wealthy would merely make an inter-vivos gift of some other
property or investment. The imposition of unfavorable estate tax treatment on life in-
surance would, as a matter of fact, affect the wealthy least of all. For the middle in-
come group, life insurance is probably the chief investment, and, therefore, an unfavor-
able rule for life insurance operates against that group. Further, life insurance is no
more "inherently testamentary" than any savings, investment or asset which is not likely
to be consumed during the life of the owner.
81. Schlesinger, supra note 66, at 246-51 suggests a composite test (as opposed to
the either-or test of the 1942 Revenue Act) whereby the amount of the proceeds equal
to the cash surrender value would be included only if the decendent possessed incidents
of ownership at death, and the rest of the proceeds would be tested by the premium-
payment theory.
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other advantages in investing in an insurance policy besides assuring the
family of some wealth at the insured's death. The utilization of the
policy for loan purposes and the ready liquidity offered by the cash
surrender value provision are examples. The life insurance policy is
not exclusively a death-oriented instrument.82 Further, there are many
other kinds of property purchased which, as a general rule, the owner
does not intend to dispose of before his death such as the family home
and the family business. There are many other occasions when the
decedent has invested in other kinds of property with full intention to
hold the property and pass it on to his family. Yet, with any of these
other kinds of investments, if an inter-vivos, irrevocable and complete
transfer is made there is no inclusion in the gross estate in the absence
of the applicability of the contemplation of death section.8" Certainly
if a transfer of life insurance was made by the decedent within the
time when the contemplation of death presumption is raised,8" that pro-
vision should be used to determine whether there is an inclusion as it
is in the case of transfers of other kinds of property and investments.
The present basis for inclusion of the value of life insurance in the
gross estate is desirable. No clear reason appears for distinguishing
life insurance from other investments.5 The inclusion of the value of
life insurance because the decedent retained control over the economic
value of the asset is proper. This places life insurance on an equal estate
tax basis with other kinds of economic wealth-the desirable result.
II. TREATMENT OF THE TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE
By THE COURTS
A. The Insurance-Annuity, Trust-Annuity, Private Annuity Problem:
The Enwsculation of Section 2036.
Under the Revenue Act of 1926 Congress exempted from the gross
82. Bittker believes that the premium-payment test should be re-enacted since "it
is basically an instrument for providing for one's heirs." Bittker, supra note 76, at 868.
In our society this is true of any investment, whether in common stocks, bank savings
accounts, realty or business interests, which is of greater value than the amount needed
to provide for an individual's customary needs during his life span.
83. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.
84. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035 (b).
85. Except the preferential income tax treatment the transferee-owner receives.
See Part (B) of this Section supra. The income tax suggestions I have made earlier
would very likely lessen the possibility of insurance policies being transferred in order
to reduce the gross estate. If a paid-up policy were transferred in order to remove the
investment from the gross estate, of course, the income tax treatment suggested would
not be a deterrent. The real difficulty in that case, it is submitted, is the failure of
Congress to correlate the gift and estate taxes. As a matter of sound policy, taxable
gifts made and the gross estate should be combined and taxed in a progressive rate
scale together.
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estate $40,000 of proceeds of policies taken out by the decedent on his
own life received "as insurance" by beneficiaries other than the deced-
ent's estate." In Helvering v. LeGierse" the Supreme Court construed
the phrase "as insurance" not to refer to proceeds of an insurance con-
tract purchased in concert with an annuity contract in order to eliminate
the element of insurance risk ordinarily carried by the company.8" Al-
though the decedent in LeGierse was eighty years of age when she exe-
cuted the single-premium life insurance contract and the single-premium
annuity contract, she was not required to take a physical examination.
In all respects but one the contracts were separate, with independent
applications, premium computations and payments, and reserves. The
insurance policy, however, would not have been issued without the
purchase of the annuity contract.89 The Court made two precise holdings
in LeGierse. Since the element of risk necessary to call a transaction
"insurance" was absent, the proceeds were not received "as insurance"
by the beneficiary, and the exemption therefore would not be allowed ;"O
and, since the decedent had retained the insurance policies, the proceeds
could only be enjoyed by the beneficiary at or after the decedent's death,
so the proceeds would be included in the decedent's gross estate."' Left
unanswered by LeGierse was the effect of an inter-vivos transfer of the
insurance policies by the decedent.
This question was answered by the Supreme Court in Fidelity-
86. See note 67 supra.
87. 312 U.S. 531 (1941). See also the companion case to LeGierse, Keller v. Com-
missioner, 312 U.S. 543 (1941).
88. In Commissioner v. Keller's Estate, 113 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1940), affirmed in
the companion case to LeGierse, see note 87 supra, the court stated "It is plain in our
estimation that Congress used the word 'insurance' with the economic rather than the
purely contractual aspects of the term in mind. The statute prescribes an exemption
prompted by a settled policy favoring the institution of life insurance." 113 F.2d at 835.
89. The Court stated about the "two independent contracts": "The two contracts
must be considered together. To say they are distinct transactions is to ignore actuality,
for it is conceded on all sides and was found as a fact by the Board of Tax Appeals that
the 'insurance policy would not have been issued without the annuity contract. Failure,
even studious failure, in one contract to refer to the other cannot be controlling." 312
U.S. at 540.
90. "Considered together, the contracts wholly fail to spell out any element of in-
surance risk. It is true that the 'insurance' contract looks like an insurance policy, con-
tains all the usual provisions of one, and could have been assigned or surrendered with-
out annuity. Certainly the mere presence of the customary provisions does not create
risk, and the fact that the policy could have been assigned is immaterial since, no matter
who held the policy and the annuity, the two contracts, relating to the life of the one to
whom they were originally issued, still counteracted each other . . . . Any risk that the
prepayment would earn less than the amount paid to respondent as an annuity was an
investment risk similar to the risk assumed by a bank; it was not an insurance risk as
explained above." 312 U.S. at 541-42.
91. 312 U.S. at 542.
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Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith. 2 Essentially the facts were the same
as in LeGierse, except the decedent in Fidelity had made an irrevocable
and complete inter-vivos transfer of the life insurance policy.93 The
Government sought to include the proceeds under the section of the
revenue code which required the inclusion in the gross estate of the
value of property transferred under which the decedent had retained for
life the right to the income from the property." The district court9 '
found an inclusion improper since the annuity contract and the insurance
policy were separable after they had been issued to the decedent. 6 The
court of appeals9 ' reversed, holding the inclusion proper since "the sub-
stance of the matter is that a capital fund-the premium-was deposited
with the insurance company for a guaranteed annual return and repay-
ment of the residue to beneficiaries on the death of the depositor."9"
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held the inclusion
improper since no amount of the annuity payments could be considered
proceeds from the property represented by the transferred insurance
policy.9 To make the case for inclusion, the Court argued, the Govern-
92. 356 U.S. 274 (1958).
93. Actually there were three life insurance policies and three annuity contracts,
but for purposes of discussion one combination will be used.
94. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 811(c) (1) (B), 53 Stat. 1. This provision is
now found in IiiT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a), which in its entirety reads as follows:
"(a) GENERAL RuLE.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property (except real property situated outside of the United States) to the extent of
any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case
of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth),
by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for any period not
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end
before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the per-
sons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom."
95. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company v. Smith, 142 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa.
1956).
96. "The determination should rest upon the realities of the situation and the essen-
tial nature of the donee's ownership. The realities of the situation are that this decedent
made investments which were not true insurance because no risk element to the insurer
was involved. However, the life policies and annuity contracts were, on their faces,
separate contracts and, while they must be read together to determine the realities, no
valid reason is advanced by the defendant to hold that such an obligatory joint perusal
welds them together permanently and indissolubly for all purposes." 142 F. Supp. at 567.
97. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company v. Smith, 241 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1957).
98. 241 F.2d at 692.
99. "The annuities arose from personal obligations of the insurance companies
which were in no way conditioned on the continued existence of the life insurance con-
tracts. These periodic payments would have continued unimpaired and without diminu-
tion in size throughout the life of the insured even if the life insurance policies had been
extinguished. Quite clearly the annuity payments arose solely from the annuity policies.
The use and enjoyment of the annuity policies were entirely independent of the life iti-
surance policies," 3$6 U.S. 4t 280-81,
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ment had to show that the premiums of the two contracts were aggre-
gated and the annuity payments derived as income from the entire in-
vestment.' The Court indicated that this showing could not be made
since annuity payments in the same amount could have been purchased
separately for the same premium paid by the decedent. 1' Although it
is true, the Court admitted, that the insurance policy was dependent on
the annuity policy for its existence, the same dependency was not true
of the annuity policy. Since the annuity in fact was separate, the Court
reasoned, payments under it could not be considered income from the
total investment made by the decedent. 2
As a matter of substance, the annuity contract and the insurance
policy were purchased by the decedent with a total investment of 110%
of the face value of the insurance policy, with the face value of the
insurance policy to be paid on the death of the decedent and the annuity
to be paid for life.' The face amount of the insurance policy de-
termined tie total cost of the investment, with the investment then
divided into two amounts by the company-one allocated to the insurance
policy and one to the annuity contract. 4 A minimum level of annuity
cost was dictated by the face value of the insurance policy. The annuity
payments represented a return of approximately 2Y2% yearly on the
total investment, after deducting the amount of overhead required by
100. "To establish its contention, the Government must aggregate the premiums of
the annuity policies with those of the life insurance policies and establish that the an-
nuity payments were derived as income from the entire investment." 356 U.S. at 280.
101. Compare this reasoning with the analysis of the Court in Helvering v. LeGierse,
312 U.S. 531 (1941). In LeGierse the Court clearly recognized the investment transac-
tion for what it was-the prepayment of the face sum of the insurance policy, with in-
terest payments from that face sum to be made as the annuity payments. "Here the
total consideration was prepaid and exceeded the face value of the 'insurance' policy.
The excess financed loading and other incidental charges. Any risk that the prepay-
ment would earn less than the amount paid to respondent as an annuity was an invest-
ment risk similar to the risk assummed by a bank . . . ." 312 U.S. at 542.
102. Compare this analysis with the construction of the transaction viewed by the
Third Circuit in the Keller case. See note 88 supra. "In other words, the sure thing
(loan) is artificially separated into doubtful bet (life insurance) and hedge (annuity)
... . That being so, we can detect no substantial economic distinction between the
conjoint effect of the two policies issued, and that of an engagement to repay Mrs. Keller,
or her order, $20,000 upon her death with interest at almost exactly 2% per annum . . .
in the meantime." Commissioner v. Keller's Estate, 113 F.2d 833, 834-35 (3d Cir. 1940).
103. One of the single premium life insurance policies was purchased for a pre-
mium of $179,358 and had a face value of $200,000. The annuity was purchased for
a premium of $40,642 and provided for annual payments of $5,026 for life. The two
premiums added together total precisely $220,000 or 110% of the face value of the life
insurance policy.
104. If the uninsurable applicant desired a $100,000 face value insurance policy, the
total premiums of the two contracts would have to equal $110,000 (110% of the face
value), which was true of a second policy and annuity contract taken out by the de-
cedent in Fidelity.
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the company."'s If the insurance policy were not surrendered for its
cash value by its owner before the death of the decedent, the simple
structure of the transaction would be a yearly payment to the decedent
of 2Y/ % on the total investment, with the face amount of the invest-
ment, less company overhead costs, payable on the death of the decedent." 6
Rigid notions of "property," caused by a refusal to look at the
investment, lead to the result in Fidelity. The Court concedes that the
insurance-annuity combination was "the product of a single, integrated
transaction" ;1° 7 this concession was necessary unless the Court was
ready to overrule LeGierse. But LeGierse went further to hold that
the insurance policy received from the company by the decedent was not
an "insurance" policy for purposes of the estate tax; rather, it was a
document representing certain rights resulting from the original inte-
grated transaction. In Fidelity the court finds that after the initial
transaction each of the indicia of property interest held by the decedent,
i.e., the annuity contract and the insurance policy are not only divisible
but actually are two separate items of property."' This is completely
unrealistic. Merely because the insurance company gives two contracts
as documentation of the rights of the decedent in the original invest-
ment does not make the two pieces of paper two separate pieces of
property; rather, the two contracts represent interests retained by the
decedent in the original indivisible investment."0 ' The rights held by
105. See note 103 supra.
106. See note 102 supra.
107. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274, 280 (1958).
108. In Ogleheart v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1949) the taxpayer had
purchased single premium policies from the insurance company, paying the face value of
the policy in return for annual payments and the right to payment of the fixed sum on
surrender of the contract or payment of the fixed sum to designated beneficiaries upon
his death. The issue before the court was whether the sums received annually were
annuities. The court held "that the phrase, 'amounts received as an annuity,' as now
used in Code Sec. 22(b) (2) has reference only to periodic payments which represent a
combined return of capital and interest. The formula adopted was never intended to
exempt payments which in their entirety represent interest and do not deplete the prin-
cipal sum invested." 174 F.2d at 607. The Fidelity case is not distinguishable from
Igleheart as long as the purchaser or transferee of the insurance policy retains the in-
surance policy. It is not until the policy is surrendered for cash value that any amount
of principal is needed to meet the annuity payments.
109. In Bohnen v. Harrison, 199 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1952) the Seventh Circuit, in
reaching a decision in accord with the Supreme Court's Fidelity decision, said: "Though
the Supreme Court has decided that such an arrangement is in the nature of a single
investment program . . . it does not follow that this investment program, made up oi
the two contracts, was indivisible." 199 F.2d at 493. Obviously, a division may be made
on the basis of the interests in the original investment; one an interest (right) to receive
income and the other was an interest in having the face value paid to the beneficiaries at
death. Compare the Bohnen opinion with the Igleheart decision, note 108 supra. Pre-
cisely the same investment is made in both cases, but the Seventh Circuit comes to dif-
ferent conclusions based on the terms of the contracts, rather than the natgre of the iii-
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the decedent after the company issues two contracts are still the income
right and the right to pass to named beneficiaries the remainder.
It is submitted that the real difficulty which the Court encountered
was a hypothetical possibility which was not presented by the facts in
Fidelity. Suppose the transferee of the insurance policy had surrendered
the policy for its cash value? Obviously the payments received by the
decedent after that surrender could not be income from the total invest-
ment. In the case of the surrender of the policy, the payments to the
decedent would come from the income earned on the part of the invest-
ment retained by the company plus a portion of the corpus of the invest-
ment itself. The court then points to a series of cases involving the
private annuity in the lower courts,"' and lends implied approval to the
notion that in order to have "income from the transferred property"
the amount paid must be income actually produced by the transferred
property and not income received for life because of the transfer of
property."' There are two basic objections to the Court's argument:
first, in the facts of Fidelity the policies were not surrendered by the
transferee," 2 nor is it likely in any normal case that they would be;..3
and secondly, even if the policies were surrendered the result the Court
should reach is inclusion of the face value of the life insurance policies."'
If the policies were surrendered the income right retained by the decedent
vestment. In Igleheart there is a pre-payment of the face amount of the insurance policy;
but the right to receive income during the life of the insured is a part of that insurance
policy-it is not separated into a separate instrument. Further, the annuity right is
lost in Igleheart should the contract be surrendered for the face value; in Bohnen and
Fidelity the value of the annuity right is lost (even though the annuity will continue to
be paid) through a payment by the company of less than the face value of the insurance
policy if it is surrendered during the life of the insured. In fact, the economic conse-
quences of the investment in both kinds of cases is precisely the same.
110. See Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274, 280 (1958).
111. See, for example, Hirsh v. United States, 35 F.2d 982 (Ct.Cl. 1929) where
the decedent transferred $50,000 worth of securities to his son (with three identical
transfers to his daughters), agreeing to receive in consideration therefore $2,000 per
year for life as an annuity payable to his wife and then to himself for life should he
survive her. The court found that "the transfer was absolute, and decedent completely
divested himself of all title, right, or interest in the securities conveyed. It is clear also
that the securities were not chargeable with the annuity." 35 F.2d at 986. Therefore
the court concludes, "the case presented is simply one where a gift and purchase of an
annuity were combined." 35 F.2d at 986.
112. See the comment in Burr v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 871, 872 (2d Cir. 1946):
"But they chose not to surrender them; and the unexercised power to do so did not
change the factual realities of the transaction. While the power was unexercised, the
investment was analogous to a simple annuity with principal payable at death, a transfer
which-even when irrevocable-is taxable under § 811 (c)."
113. Since the result would be an economic loss to the family of the difference be-
tween the cash surrender value and the face value of the policy, it is not likely the
transferees would cash in the policies.
114. The inclusion should be made under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036. See note
94 supra.
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would be met by payment of both income and corpus. Under the frame-
work of the original investment, however, the right is still an income
right. This is also true in the private-annuity transaction."1 5  The mere
fact that the annuity need not be paid out of the exact income produced
by the transferred property does not preclude the finding that the right
to receive the income arises from the transferred property. The precise
wording of the Code section. 6 is: "the right to the income from the
property"-the substance of the private annuity transaction is that the
transferor receives the right to the income from the transferred property
payable by means of income not "physically" produced by the transferred
property.
For the estate planner, the Fidelity case in its holding and in its im-
plied approval of the private-annuity cases opens wide the play of
imagination in planning property dispositions which prevent the appli-
cation of Section 2036 of the 1954 Code. The key factors to consider
are (1) a change in the form of the property transferred when it
reaches the hands of the transferee. 7 and (2) gearing the yearly income
payments to an ordinary rate on the value of the economic wealth re-
presented by the transferred asset, rather than the actual income pro-
duced by the particular form of the economic wealth which is transferred.
The utility of the Fidelity decision for the estate planner extends even
to the trust transaction as demonstrated by Becklenberg v. Commis-
sioner."' In 1938 the decedent, age 66, and her husband and son created
a trust to which all three contributed property in the form of a revoked
trust's assets. The decedent had contributed $379,000 to the original
trust, and the amount had appreciated somewhat by the time the second
trust was created. The second trust was irrevocable, but the decedent
retained the right to a payment of $10,000 per year until the trust pur-
115. The only reported recognition of this in the federal courts is a dissenting opin-
ion by Judge O'Connell in Commissioner v. Kann's Estate, 174 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1949).
In Kann/zs Estate the taxpayer transferred to her children and their respective spouses
1,120 shares of stock in return for their unsecured promises to pay her $24,672 per year.
The value of the transferred shares was greater than that necessary to produce $24,672
per year. The issue before the court was whether the transaction resulted in taxable gain
for the transferor. The majority held no, but Judge O'Connell, in dissent, indicated that
the transferor should be forced to include in gross income $24,672 per year as income
from the property transferred. "In practical effect, decedent seems to me to have done
no more than pass legal title to 1,120 shares, in return for a reserved life estate as to
$24,672 per annum of the income therefrom, and a power to invade the corpus, if neces-
sary to supplement the income if less than $24,672 per annum." 174 F.2d at 360.
116. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 2036(a).
117. A transfer of cash, with a retained right to 6% of the amount per year, would
not be taxable under the private annuity-Fidelity doctrine, since the obligation might be
paid out of the corpus of the gift, rather than its income.
118. 273 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1959).
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chased an annuity for the decedent which would pay $10,000 per year.
The decedent died before the annuity was purchased, and had received
over a period of eleven years amounts which ranged per year from $1,300
to $10,000. The executor of the estate argued that even if the decedent
had retained a right to receive $10,000 per year, she had not retained
the right to income from any property she had conveyed to the trust,
since the payment could have been made out of income or corpus of any
of the three contributions to the trust. The Tax Court"9 found that
the trustee could have made the distribution solely out of income from
the property transferred by the decedent, and that this was sufficient
for finding inclusion in the gross estate regardless of whether the pay-
ment had actually been made out of income of the decedent's contribu-
tion. ' In reversing the Tax Court, the Seventh Circuit'2 ' found as
controlling that the decedent's right to receive was not limited to income
from the transferred property. Payment could have been made by the
trustee out of property transferred by decedent's husband and son or the
income from that property or from the property (rather than income
from it) transferred by the decedent.'22 The Seventh Circuit pointed
to the Supreme Court's approval of the private-annuity case results and
compared the transaction in Becklenberg to those cases.' 23
The Becklenberg decision is in accord with the principle which led to
the result in Fidelity. The basic theory of the Fidelity case is that no
right to income from the transferred property is retained if the right to
the payment retained by the transferor is not a right to be paid directly
out of income produced specifically by the transferred property and from
no other source. In Becklenberg the payment could have been made out
of other income or property, although the right to the payment arose be-
cause of the transfer to the trust by the decedent. It is submitted that
the construction of the language of the Code is overly restrictive. The
119. Maria Becklenberg, 31 T.C. 402 (1958).
120. "In any event, we think the lack of a specific clause providing the $10,000
payment be made solely from income is immaterial. The retention of an annual distri-
bution from income is present when the settlor retains the right to annual payments of a
stipulated amount which, at the discretion of the trustee, can be made from either the
corpus or income of the property contributed by the settlor. The test of the statute is
whether decedent retained a right to income." 31 T.C. at 410. The Tax Court evaded
the implied approval of the private-annuity cases by Fidelity, indicating that they would
not apply to the trust transaction. 31 T.C. at 410.
121. 273 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1959).
122. 'We agree that the decedent retained a right to receive $10,000 annually, by
way of annuity or by distribution from the trust . . . .Unlike the Tax Court, we be-
lieve that the Trust had an obligation to pay decedent $10,000 annually, and that her
right to receive it was not limited to the property transferred by her or the income
therefrom." 273 F.2d at 301.
123. 273 F.2d at 301-2.
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substance of both the Becklenberg and Fidelity transactions is that the de-
cedent transferred property and retained an income right because of the
transfer. No income right would have arisen without the transfer, and
the transfer caused the income to flow to the transferor. In this sense.
although the transferred property does not produce the actual dollars
which meet the retained right, the retained right to income is a product
of the transferred property. The phrase "income from the transferred
property" is unduly restricted by an interpretation which changes the
language to "dollars actually produced by the transferred property." In
a practical economic sense, if ten dollars is transferred into a share of
stock which then produces income, the income is derived from the eco-
nomic wealth formerly represented by the initial ten dollars. Where
property is exchanged for a contractual right or other right to receive
income, in substance, the income received is a product of the transferred
property. Therefore, the courts err in accepting the theory of the deci-
sions in the private-annuity cases, since under any meaningful reading of
Section 2036 and its predecessors, the private-annuity cases are incor-
rectly decided.
Since the Fidelity, Becklenberg and private-annuity cases tend to de-
feat any meaningful application of Section 2036, the writer suggests a
revision of that section to the construction which follows :124
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all prop-
erty (except real property situated outside of the United States)
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at
any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth),
by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life
or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his
death or for any period which does not in fact end before his
death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of the property, or
(2) the right to receive income as a condition of the trans-
fer of the property, or
(3) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any per-
son to designate the persons who shall possess or en-
joy the property or the income received as a condition
of the transfer of the property.
124. Compare with the present language of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a), re-
ported in note 94 supra.
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The absence of the enactment of this provision, however, should not
dissuade the Supreme Court from reconsidering the insurance-annuity
problem, withdrawing its implied approval of the private-annuity cases,
and refusing to allow in the Becklenberg type trust transaction the avoid-
ance of the operation of Section 2036.
B. Life Insurance and the Estate Tax Marital Deduction: The Epitome
of the Triumph of Form over Reality.
Various options are available to the owner of a life insurance policy
in directing in what manner the proceeds of the policy shall be paid to
the beneficiary." In many cases where the decedent leaves a medium
or small sized estate, insurance comprises the bulk of the wealth. It
is in these cases that the selection of a particular option is most criti-
cal. In large estates, on the other hand, careful thought should be
given to a lump sum payment into a trust128 where investment in equity
securities would form a better hedge against inflation.127 There are a
number of reasons why the insured would choose an option for payment
rather than having a lump sum paid to the beneficiary, e.g., to prevent
immediate loss by unwise investments; warding off claims of creditors;
and to control the use of proceeds not consumed by the primary benefi-
ciary, among others. The use of an option, obviously, should be a care-
fully planned move designed to accomplish a specific purpose;2' and care
should be taken that the use of some other plan would not accomplish the
goal more efficiently.
In general there are four basic options which may be chosen with
many variations designed to meet special objectives. The interest option
provides for immediate investment at a guaranteed rate of interest with
the principal sum held by the company to be paid to ultimate beneficiaries
selected by the insured or paid under various options available to the
beneficiary. The fixed-period option provides for ratable payment of
principal and interest over a certain term of years. A fixed-amount op-
tion calls for the payment of a specific amount monthly or yearly until
the principal sum and interest have been exhausted. Also available is a
life income option which provides for a continuous payment of a par-
ticular amount during the life of the beneficiary. These various options
125. For a discussion of the various options of payment see 1 CASNER, ESTATE
PLANNING 284-300 (3d ed. 1961).
126. Further, consideration should be given to the establishment of a funded in-
surance trust. See SHATTUCK AND FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK § 8 (1953).
127. It is also wise to use an insurance trust when it is likely that minors will be
the beneficiaries.
128. The various uses of particular options to cover specific needs are discussed in
REDEKER AND REID, LiER INSuaANCE SETTLEMENT O0noNs 60-96 (1957).
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may be combined to form a hybrid. For example, a life income option
guarantying a life income to the beneficiary with a fixed period during
which the payments will be made to the life beneficiary or a contingent
beneficiary should the life beneficiary die before the expiration of the
period.
In choosing a particular option the insured should consider the wis-
dom of qualifying the proceeds for the marital deduction.129 It may be
in the insured's best interests to forego the marital deduction in order to
accomplish a goal which could not be attained by qualifying the proceeds
for the marital deduction. It is foolhardy, however, to forego the mari-
tal deduction by selecting a particular option when the same goal could
have been accomplished by a means which would allow a marital deduc-
tion as well. After the determination that it is in the best interests of the
insured to qualify the proceeds for the marital deduction the option
should be analyzed carefully to see if it falls within the terminable in-
terest rule of Section 2056 of the Code. 3 ' Even after the statute is com-
plied with, the insured needs to build a record which will be accepted in
the courts. Since the courts disregard the investment made by the owner
of an insurance policy, the life insurance contract itself should spell out
each step of the transaction indicating how the insurer is forced to handle
the invested funds (the proceeds) in complying with the option chosen
by the insured.
The refusal of the courts to analyze the investment made by the in-
sured of the life insurance proceeds is demonstrated by the Supreme
129. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056. See CASNER, op. cil. supra note 125, at 866-73.
130. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) contains the terminable interest rule limit-
ing the application of the marital deduction. The provision reads as follows:(b) LImTATioN IN THE CASE OF LIFE ESTATE OR OTHER TERMNABLE IN-
TEREST.-
(1) GENERAL RULE.-Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an
event or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur,
an interest passing to the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction
shall be allowed under this section with respect to such interest-
(A) If an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth) from the
decedent to any person other than such surviving spouse (or the estate of such
spouse); and
(B) if by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs or assigns)
may possess or enjoy any part of such property after such termination or
failure of the interest so passing to the surviving spouse;
and no deduction shall be allowed with respect to such interest (even if such
deduction is not disallowed under subparagraphs (A) and (B))-
(C) if such interest is to be acquired for the surviving spouse pursuant to
directions of the decedent, by his executor or by the trustee of a trust.
For purposes of this paragraph, an interest shall not be considered as an in-
terest which will terminate or fail merely because it is the ownership of a bond,
note, or similar contractual obligation, the discharge of which would not have
the effect of an annuity for life or for a term.
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Court's decision in Meyer v. United States.' 1 The decedent had selected
an option which provided for the payment of equal monthly installments
to his wife for her life, with 240 installments guaranteed, and further
provided that if the wife should die before receiving the 240 installments
his daughter would receive the remainder of them. If both the wife and
daughter died before receiving the 240 installments the commuted value
of those unpaid was to be paid in one sum to the estate of the last one of
them to die. The life insurance policy was silent on the question of divid-
ing the proceeds into two funds to cover the period certain and the wife's
annuity following the expiration of the period, but the insurer made a
determination of the amount needed for each of the two guaranteed pay-
ments.' The Government disallowed the marital deduction for any of
the proceeds over the taxpayer's argument that the interest of the surviv-
ing spouse in the amount necessary to fund her annuity payments after
the expiration of the period certain could only be enjoyed by the surviv-
ing spouse and therefore was not a terminable interest.' The district
court upheld the position of the taxpayer,'34 but the Second Circuit re-
versed,'35 reasoning that there is a single property, the proceeds, which
would terminate and pass to the daughter should the wife not survive for
240 months after the decedent's death. The Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the Second Circuit, 3 ' and the opinion of the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Whittaker, pinpoints the improper manner
which courts generally follow in deciding insurance tax cases:
Whether a policy of life insurance may create several 'prop-
erties' or funds, either terminable or nonterminable or both, we
need not decide, for we think the policy here involved constituted
only one property . . . . The policy made no provision for the
creation of two separate properties . . . . The wife and daugh-
ter were, respectively, primary and contingent beneficiaries of
131. 364 U.S. 410 (1960).
132. The insurance company calculated a certain sum needed to fund the monthly
income for 20 years, and secondly the amount needed to fund the monthly income there-
after for the surviving spouse.
133. By directing the investment of the proceeds in this manner the decedent se-
cured two interests to pass to his beneficaries. One was an interest in having the spe-
cified amount paid for a term certain-twenty years. The second was an interest in
having the specific amount paid to his wife for as long as she should live after the ex-
piration of twenty years. By looking only at the contract, and not at the investment, the
interests seem to be: the wife is to receive the specific amount per month for life, but
if she dies within twenty years the amount is to go to the daughter for the remainder of
the twenty year period. The latter construction disregards the reality of the investment
made by the decedent.
134. Meyer v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 629 (W.D.N.Y. 1958).
135. Meyer v. United States, 275 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1959).
136. See note 131 supra.
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the policy alone . . .. Their rights derive solely from the
policy. [Emphasis added.]137
The Court refused to consider the investment of funds secured by the de-
cedent in selecting the particular option; the policy alone may be con-
sidered.138 As Judge WXraterman, in dissenting in the Second Circuit
opinion, observed, "I interpret the difference between my colleagues and
me to turn on the fact that they are unwilling to consider as done what
actually was done. They believe that, because there was no specific
contract authorizing segregation, it is improper for estate tax purposes
to divide the insurance proceeds into two funds."' 39
The Meyer case stands as a symbol, a nightmarish blueprint, for the
manner in which insurance tax cases should not be analyzed. The stub-
born refusal to consider the manner in which the decedent has invested
his funds and the unimaginative literal reading of the life insurance con-
tract-these stand as the marks of gross inadequacy in analyzing the tax
consequences of the life insurance transaction. For the estate planner
and the life underwriter the case clearly delineates the necessity for spell-
ing out in the life insurance contract the investment made if tax advan-
tages flow from the investment. If adverse tax advantages might accrue
from the investment, two contracts should be executed (as in Fidelity)4
to assure the courts' bestowing undue tax favoritism caused by their pre-
occupation with contract terms and their inability or refusal to "consider
as done what actually was done."''
III. SUMMARY
The federal statutory income taxation of life insurance is replete
with special tax advantages not bestowed on many other forms of in-
vested wealth. This discrimination violates the basic principles upon
which the taxing structure is based, and no valuable goal is attained by
continuing the discrimination. The statutory income taxation of life in-
surance wealth should be modified to achieve a similarity in the treat-
ment of life insurance and other forms of invested wealth. Statutory
137. 364 U.S. at 413-14.
138. Implicit in Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent is the analysis of the insurance in-
vestment. "Plainly there may be more than one 'interest' in a single 'property.' A de-
duction is not denied merely because the surviving spouse and someone else each have an
'interest' in the same 'property.' . . . These insurance policies created, of course, no
fund or res. . . . Yet that seems immaterial. Each represented a chose in action. The
wife or daughter, as the case might be, could sue for the one during the 20-year period.
Only the wife could enforce the claim here in question." 364 U.S. at 419.
139. 275 F.2d at 88.
140. See Part (A) of this section supra.
141. See note 139 stepra, and accompanying text.
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federal estate and gift taxation, however, places life insurance on a par
with other investment property. Congress should not heed the call for
the reintroduction of the payment-of-premiums test since this would
destroy the equality of estate tax treatment and would discriminate
against the middle income families. In analyzing insurance tax cases,
federal courts have evidenced a complete disregard for the realities of the
insurance investment and have hinged their decisions on the form of the
life insurance contract. A reversal of performance in life insurance tax
cases is essential; a critical analysis of the actualities of the investment
made should control the result. Until effort along these lines is made by
Congress and the courts, the taxation of life insurance will continue to
be a haphazard combination of inequity and unreality.
